Kargil Internationalized the Kasmir issue and put a death knell to Simla Rebuttal to Cohen’s Four Crises and a Peace Process
It seems like every few Mr. Cohen in the employment of the Indian Lobby comes out with a new book or writing regurgitating the “same old wine in new bottle”. No matter how many times Mr. Cohen with new acolytes repeats the same old nonsense, it does not make it true. Nawaz Sharif visit to the White House made his life miserable in the dungeons of the Attock Fort. Any other leader that makes similar blunders will also receive the same fate.
Hari Singh, the last Maharaja of Kashmir was a weak vacillating man whose perversions and orgies had given him the reputation of the Himalayan Brogia. Unfortunately, Hari Singh, the man who was Mr. A had titillated the readers of the British penny press before the war, was something else. He was the hereditary Hindu maharaja of the most strategically situated princely state in India.
Demographic logic used by the Radcliff boundary commission to separate India and Pakistan seemed to dictate that Kashmir join with Pakistan. Its people were Moslem. It had been one of the areas originally selected for an Islamic state by Rehmat Ali when he formulated his impossible dream. The k in Pakistan was for Kashmir.
Hari Singh the last playboy Raja of Kashmir was an abdominal character-less hedonist bi-sexual. His only redeeming quality was that he held out against Patels bullying. Hari Singh was escorted out of the state under the curfew of the Indian army. India claims that next day he signed the so called article of accession to India. According to Alistair Lamb a noted historian of Kashmir, has cast several doubts on the article of accession. India's claim to accession is in dispute. The U.N. recognised the dispute, and treats Kashmir as disputed territory between India and Pakistan.
Indian forces landed in Kashmir before the insurrection of the local Kashmiris against the Maharaja (source Alister Lamb).
There are serious question on the dates on which the so called article of accession was signed, sealed or delivered to Lord Mountbatten. The Indian government claims that the so called article of accession is lost, if it ever existed.
Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition (OUP, 1998) comes to the conclusion that the instrument of accession was not signed on the date claimed by the Indian government to legitimise its sending of troops into Kashmir. American scholar Stanley Wolpert relates the accession story in his 1996 book, Nehru: A tryst with Destiny, basing it on the lack of concordance between versions of the accession. Wolpert writes that Menon returned from Srinagar on 26 October 'with no Instrument of Accession' to report on the perilous condition in Kashmir to the Defence Committee. Only after Mountbatten had allowed the airlift of Indian troops on 27 October, did Menon and Mahajan set out for Jammu 'to get the Instrument of Accession'. The Maharaja signed the Instrument after the Indian troops had assumed control of the state of Jammu and Kashmir's summer capital, Srinagar. If Wolpert's version is accepted then the 'conspiracy' of legalising the airlift becomes acceptable. Lamb thinks that it is possible that 'certainly Menon, perhaps Mountbatten, perhaps Nehru and perhaps Patel' were involved in this conspiracy. Lamb also claims that the document of accession does not exist
Amazingly Mr. Cohen does not mention the UN resolution and India's non-compliance to it. You fail to mention Nehru's commitments to the world, tot he Kashmiris and to Pakistan on holding a plebiscite.Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990 (OUP, 1991) rates Owen Dixon very highly as an investigator and regards his reports to the UN Security Council as most elegantly framed and insightful. After a number of attempts, Dixon failed to convince India to accept new modalities of demilitarisation of the State before holding the plebiscite. He also suggested holding regional plebiscites which would have divided Jammu & Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Josef Korbel, commenting on Dixon's effort in his book Danger in Kashmir (OUP reprint 2002), noted that Dixon 'appeared sceptical of the ability of the United Nations to force upon India any just solution'.
Kashmir in the United Nations
Resolution 38 (1948) adopted by the Security Council at its 229th Meeting held on 17 January 1948
Resolution 39 (1948) adopted by the Security Council at its 230th Meeting held on 20 January 1948
Draft Resolution presented by the President of the Security Council and the Rapporteur on 6 February 1948
Resolution 47 (1948) adopted by the Security Council at its 286th Meeting held on 21 April 1948
Resolution 51 (1948) adopted by the Security Council at its 312th Meeting held on 3 June 1948
Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948
Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949
Proposal in respect of Jammu and Kashmir made by General A.G.L. McNaughton, President of the Security Council of the United Nations on 22 December 1949
Resolution 80 (1950) adopted by the Security Council at its 470th Meeting held on 14 March 1950
Resolution 91 (1951) adopted by the Security Council at its 539th Meeting held on 30 March 1951
Resolution 96 (1951) adopted by the Security Council al its 566th Meeting held on 10 November 1951
Resolution 98 (1952) adopted by the Security Council at its 611th Meeting held on 23 December 1952
Resolution 122 (1957) adopted by the Security Council at its 765th Meeting held on 24 January 1957
Draft Resolution presented by Australia, Cuba, U.K. and U.S.A. on 14 February 1957
Resolution 123 (1957) adopted by the Security Council at its 774th Meeting held on 21 February 1957
Draft Resolution presented by Australia, Columbia,Philippines on 16 November 1957
Resolution 126 (1957) adopted by the Security Council at its 808th Meeting held on 2 December 1957
Draft Resolution submitted by Ireland to the Security Council on June 22, 1962
Statement of the President of the Security Council (French Representative) made on the 18 May 1964 at the 1117th Meeting of the Council (Document No. S/PV. 1117, dated the 18 May l964) summarizing the conclusion of the debate on Kashmir
Resolution 209 (1965) adopted by the Security Council at its 1237th Meeting held on 4 September 1965
Resolution 210 (1965) adopted by the Security Council at its 1238th Meeting held on 6 September 1965
Resolution 211 (1965) adopted by the Security Council at its 1242nd Meeting held on 20 September 1965
Resolution 214 (1965) adopted by the Security Council at its 1245th Meeting held on 27 September 1965
Resolution 215 (1965) adopted by the Security Council at its1251st Meeting held on 5 November 1965
Resolution 303 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its1606th Meeting held on 6 December 1971
Question considered by the Security Council at its 1606th, 1607th and 1608th Meetings held on 4,5 and 6 December 1971
Resolution 307 (1971) adopted by the Security Council at its 1616th Meeting held on 21 December 1971
Appeals, therefore, to both parties, in seeking a solution by negotiation under the auspices of the Council, to cooperate with each other and with the Council in developing specific proposals and, to this end, to apply the following principles which, in the opinion of the Council, should, among others, constitute the basis of a just settlement;
Acts of violence and hostility must end।
The withdrawal and continued exclusion of all irregular forces and armed individuals who have entered Jammu and Kashmir from outside must be brought about, each party using to that end all the influence at its disposal।
Regular armed forces in aid of the establishment and maintenance of order must be made available. In this connection the Governments should seek to ensure cooperation between their military forces to establish order and security until the question of accession shall have been determined by the plebiscite.
Regular armed forces must be withdrawn as soon as reestablishment of law and order permits।
After acts of violence and hostility have ceased, all citizens of the Jammu and Kashmir State, who had left on account of the recent disturbances, shall be invited and be free to return to their homes and to exercise all their rights without any restrictions on legitimate political activity. There shall be no victimization. All political prisoners should be released.
The conditions necessary for a free and fair plebiscite on the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan, including an interim administration which will command confidence and respect of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir must be established।
Such conditions include that the plebiscite must be organized, held and supervised under the authority of the Security Council at the earliest possible date.